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Introduction
We develop a model to analyze the determinants and effects of an imperfect transferability of human capital on talented natives and immigrants within a Federation. The model reveals that imperfect skill-transferability within a Federation both induces and is induced by low mobility of the natives in that Federation. Low mobility leads to an inferior matching between jobs and workers and makes immigration into the Federation less attractive especially for more talented individuals. We use the model to evaluate the Bologna and the Lisbon Process as an effort to increase transferability within Europe. We study in how far these measures can achieve their proclaimed goals of reducing mismatches between jobs and skills and attracting highly skilled immigrants in the global competition for international talent. The paper's contributions are as follows. We first show how imperfect transferability of human capital limits mobility and how it affects the distribution of talents. Attributing the imperfect transferability to divergent education systems and working cultures provides us with a rationale to endogenize it: high migration flows lead to an internationalization of workplaces and, thereby, induce a harmonization of working cultures, so that human capital becomes more transferable across borders. On the other hand, low migration flows result in imperfect transferability of human capital. Hence, we endogenize the degree of transferability as the outcome of a coordination game between potential migrants. Depending on the coordination, we obtain two possible equilibria: an efficient equilibrium with high migration and a high degree of transferability, and an inefficient equilibrium with low migration and a low degree of transferability.
We, subsequently, explain the empirically low intra-European migration rates as the result of a coordination failure that leads to the inefficient equilibrium. We then discuss possible approaches to increase the transferability of human capital, starting from this inefficient equilibrium. We first argue that public policy is able to increase transferability directly by harmonizing education systems -a policy measure that is currently implemented coop-eratively in most European countries within the framework of the so-called Bologna Process. Second, we show under which conditions such direct targeting of the transferability of human capital will lead to an equilibrium with high migration flows and under which conditions other measures, i.e. a reduction of direct migration costs, are needed to secure the efficient equilibrium. Next, we identify and compute the local welfare effects of these policies.
We further argue that imperfect transferability of human capital within Europe constitutes a handicap in the global competition of talents. We investigate theoretically how imperfect transferability affects migration decisions of non-European young immigrants, e.g., university students, who may choose between immigration into Europe and immigration into the U.S. Finally, we identify and compute the local welfare effects of changes in immigration rates.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section puts our model and results in relation to the current European political debate on migration and, in addition, relates them to the economic literature. Section 3 develops the formal model in which we derive our results. In Section 4 we endogenize the transferability of human capital and study how imperfect transferability of human capital affects local migration decisions. Section 5 analyzes the effects of imperfect transferability on global competition for international talents. We relate these results to the Bologona and Lisbon Process in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Political Context and Related Literature
Before the 2004 enlargement, fears about potential detrimental effects of labor migration within Europe were widespread among European politicians in national governments. However, labor migration within Europe remained low, much lower than in regions of comparable size, like the U.S.
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This may be considered good news for opponents to migration who fear a compression of wages in the receiving countries and a brain drain in the sending countries. However, with low migration the potential benefits of a better matching between skills and jobs that are expected from a unified European labor market do not materialize. Thus, as long as Europeans are unable or unwilling to move along with the best jobs, Europe's productivity will remain below its potential. Moreover, not only migration within Europe, but also skilled immigration into Europe is lower than a growing number of politicians and businessmen believe would be good for Europe's economy.
3 "We are not good enough at attracting highly skilled people," the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, admitted at a press conference. 4 Empirical evidence for this claim abounds. Gleis, Uebelmesser, and Werding (2008) show that the U.S. attracts a considerably higher share of the world's highly skilled labor than European countries like France and Germany, or even the U.K. As replicated in Figure 1 , Boeri (2008) confirms this finding. The U.S. attracts about twice as much immigrants with a tertiary degree than Europe (see left panel in Figure 1 ). Second, immigrants in the EU score considerably lower in all IALS literacy tests than immigrants in New Zealand (see right panel 1 For empirical studies that prove labor migration within Europe to be persistently low, see e.g. Geis, Uebelmesser, and Werding (2008) and Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) . For an empirical comparative study showing that labor migration is considerably lower in Europe than in the U.S., see Peri (2005) and (2007).
2 Fidrmuc (2004) shows for Eastern Europe that the propensity to migrate in reaction to asymmetric regional shocks is low. This indeed suggests (for Eastern Europe) that matching between skills and capital is imperfect. Puhani (2001) shows empirically that it is "extremely unlikely" that labor mobility in Europe works as an adjustment mechanism against asymmetric labor market shocks. Arntz (2005) shows that the unemployed in Germany have a low propensity to migrate in regions with less tight labor markets. By contrast, Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) show that in the U.S., internal mobility of the Youth is strong and mainly driven by reactions to mismatches between skills and jobs. in Figure 1 ). Third, the distribution of average IALS scores of immigrants in a European country like Germany lies below that of the country's natives; whereas in Canada, immigrants and natives have the same IALS score distribution (see lower panel in Figure 1 ). The conjecture suggests itself that these two phenomena -low labor mobility within Europe and low skilled immigration into Europe -are interrelated. If barriers to mobility are still high in Europe, a potential immigrant must take into account her low prospects of insuring herself against asymmetric regional shocks on the European labor market. Thus, she might prefer migration into another region, like Canada or the U.S., where she knows that she will be able to move along with the best jobs.
Methodically, our main contribution is to endogenize the transferability of human capital by modeling it as an outcome of a coordination game between potential migrants.
5 Thus, the current paper is the first to bridge the gap between the literature that looks at migration as a coordination game with complementarities and the literature that investigates the effects of imperfect transferability of human capital. Contributions to the first-mentioned stream of literature are, for instance, Hendricks (2001) , Giannetti (2003) , and Stark (2004) who model complementarities of the productivity of migrants similarly. Hendricks (2001) assumes that an individual's earnings increase in the average level of the productivity of its ethnic group. In the model of Giannetti (2003) , an individual's skill premium increases in the average level of productivity of the location where he works; and Stark (2004) assumes that an individual's productivity increases in the average human capital of the economy.
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Complementarities between migrants are different in our framework, because we do not assume a direct effect of any individual migrant on the productivity of the labor force in his destination country. Instead, we model migration as a critical mass game: A sufficiently high flow of high-skilled migration can internationalize work-places in the destination country such that human capital acquired in the source country becomes more transferable across the border.
Our paper is further related to the literature on transferability of human capital. This literature started with Roy's seminal paper on the self-selection of migrants (Roy (1951) ). Borjas (1994) formalizes Roy's ideas, while Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) find empirical support. Subsequent work is mostly empirical. For instance, Chiswick (1978) finds that schooling has a lower effect on earnings of immigrants and partly interprets this finding as support 5 To our knowledge, there are no other fully microfounded models of migration with endogenous skill-transferability. In an important theoretical and empirical study, Duleep and Regets (1999) endogenize skill-transferability. But the model is not fully microfounded, and migration is not described as a coordination problem. 6 Mechtenberg and Strausz (2008) provide a theoretical analysis of the Bologna Process in which the talents of student migrants and the quality of higher education in a given country are complementary.
for imperfect skill-transferability. Duleep and Regets (2002) also find empirical support for the hypothesis of declining transferability of human capital for immigrants in the U.S. Thus, imperfect transferability of human capital has become an empirical fact. Yet, despite its empirical importance, little is known about the determinants of skill-transferability and most work treats it as a black box. With respect to this literature, a contribution of our paper is, therefore, to go beyond a straightforward comparative statics analysis in the degree of skill-transferability and address the actual determinants of imperfect transferability such as differences in working cultures.
The Model
Consider a federation that consists of two countries. In each country there are individuals of mass one, who, in period t = 1, each enrol in higher education at their home university. The acquired human capital from higher education is one times the individual's talent θ ∈ [0, 1]. The two countries are symmetric; they do not differ in educational quality or the distribution of talents. In particular, we assume that, in each country, talent θ is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1] . We refer to individuals with a higher education as graduates. Apart from talent, a graduate's productivity y i depends on the state of the economy in the country where she works. A country has either a normal or a booming economy. If the graduate i stays in her country of birth, and if the economy there is normal, her productivity equals her human capital, i.e. y i = θ i . By contrast, if the graduate's country of birth has a booming economy, her productivity there is enhanced by a positive regional shock, i.e. y i = θ i (1 + π), with π ∈ (0, 1). The parameter π ∈ (0, 1) represents the positive economic shock and more talented graduates benefit proportionally more from a booming economy. The assumption π < 1 guarantees that the graduate's benefits from education, θ i , are more important than the productivity gain θ i π < θ i from favorable economic conditions. In this sense, education is a more important determinant of productivity than a country's economic conditions.
Each graduate decides, in period t = 2, in which of the two countries she wants to work. Graduates observe the countries' economic conditions when they make their decision. Differences in economic conditions, therefore, drive migration incentives. To keep our analysis tractable, we assume that exactly one country has a booming economy, whilst the other country has a normal economy. We denote the booming country by H and the other country by L. Before graduates complete their education, it is, however, not known which of the two countries will have the booming economy in period t = 2. In particular, we assume that, in t = 1, the two countries are equally likely to obtain a booming economy. From the perspective of period t = 1, both countries are, therefore, fully symmetric.
If a graduate decides to migrate, she incurs a fixed migration cost c > 0. This cost captures the migrant's relocation expenses and other burdens. In addition to the fixed costs c, a migrant also loses a part of her human capital from education. In particular, we assume that a graduate θ i who migrates from country L to country H has a productivity θ i (α+π). The transferability parameter α < 1 captures the idea that an education is more valuable in the country where it was acquired than in a foreign country. This assumption captures a stylized fact reported by a large part of the migration literature. Moreover, it seems especially appropriate in the European context, where part of the education is country-specific and countries differ in languages and working cultures. The transferability parameter α plays a crucial role in our analysis. We endogenize it in Section 4 and argue that it captures in a reduced form the main target of the Bologna and Lisbon process. Note that when α + π < 1, the loss of human capital offsets any gain from migrating to a booming economy. For this reason, we restrict attention to α + π > 1.
We abstract from unemployment among graduates; in each country a firm employs all the graduates on a country's labor market so that they can always realize their full productivity. A graduate appropriates a fixed share γ of her Third, nature determines which country has the better economy. Fourth, graduates decide whether or not to expend a cost c and lose a share (1 − α) of their higher education to migrate into the neighboring country. Finally, graduates work and the productivity of a given graduate is shared between herself and the non-academics in the country in which she works.
Intra-Federal Mobility
We first focus on intra-federal mobility and study the migration decision of the natives in the countries H and L. First consider a graduate with talent θ i from country H. She obtains a payoff γθ i (1 + π) if she remains in country H and obtains the payoff γθ i α − c if she migrates to country L. Hence, a graduate from the high productivity country has no incentive to migrate and, therefore, there is no migration from H to L.
In contrast, a graduate i from country L obtains the payoff γθ i if she remains in L, whereas migrating to country H yields her a payoff γθ i (α + π) − c. Hence, a graduate from country L with talent θ i migrates exactly when
Letᾱ ≡ 1 − π + c/γ so thatθ(α) is smaller than 1 only if α >ᾱ. Then, we obtain the following result:
The comparative statics are intuitive: The flow of migration increases in the bargaining power of the labor force, γ, in the size of the economic shock π, and decreases with the direct costs of migration, c. Because c is independent of talent, it is the highly talented graduates who migrate, whereas the less talented graduates remain in their home country.
Moreover, Lemma 1 reveals two effects of the imperfect transferability of human capital α < 1. First, there is less migration than in a situation in which human capital is fully transferable across borders:θ(α) <θ(1). Consequently, the overall surplus generated on the labor market of the federation is lower with α < 1 than it would have been with α = 1. The reason is that, for α < 1, the matching of jobs to graduates is inefficient. Second, low transferability α amplifies the effect that migrants are the more talented graduates.
Coordinating Migration
The proportional loss of human capital associated with migration, (1 − α), represents an inefficiency from the diversity in national education systems, working cultures, and languages within Europe. The literature hitherto treats this loss as exogenous. By contrast, we view the transferability parameter α as a policy variable that is endogenous in two ways. First, it depends on the comparability and the universal curriculum of higher education systems. Second and probably more importantly, the parameter depends on the diversity in working cultures and languages spoken on the job. These differences become smaller when the workforce becomes more internationalized. The underlying idea is that firms adapt their working culture to migrants if they come in large numbers. For instance, it may become unnecessary for a migrant to learn the native language of her destination country before realizing her full potential at work, since the firm where she starts working might switch to English as a focal language when its labor force becomes more international.
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Due to this effect, mobility and the degree of transferability are interdependent and self-enforcing: The more graduates ignore national borders and move along with the more productive jobs, the more firms and workers find it attractive to harmonize working cultures and switch to a common international language. This then facilitates migration between these countries, because human capital will become more easily transferable across borders. Hence, internationalization increases with migration, which, in its turn, increases with internationalization.
We model the outcome from this self-enforcing process as follows. Let m denote the share of European migrants from the low productivity country L to the high productivity country H. We assume that if m is larger than some cut-off valuem ∈ (0, 1), then a harmonization of working cultures and languages in countries 1 and 2 occurs. We take the extreme that, if m ≥m, diversity between working cultures and languages spoken on the job disappears completely so that human capital becomes fully transferable across borders. Formally,
Consequently, migration becomes a coordination game between graduates. In order to investigate the outcomes of the coordination game, definê
We haveα ∈ (α, 1) exactly whenm < 1 − c/(γπ). Moreover, let m * and α * denote the equilibrium share of migrants and the equilibrium share of post-migration human capital, respectively. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium outcomes (m * , α * ) of the coordination game. Figure 3 illustrates the different equilibria and their relation to the transferability variable α for the two casesα > 1 andα ≤ 1. For a thorough understanding of how the intensity of (anticipated) international migration and the transferability of human capital across borders influence each other, it is helpful to investigate in more detail the qualitative differences between the multiple migration equilibria. is Pareto dominant, because it allows for migration without any loss of human capital. In the high-migration equilibrium, graduates expect migration to be intensive enough to harmonize working cultures and to raise the transferability of human capital α to 1. Accordingly, graduates expect no loss of their human capital from migration into the better economy, thereby collectively rationalizing their expectations. When graduates have pessimistic expectations, low-migration equilibria obtain that are Pareto inferior. Such expectations can even lead to the total absence of migration. If graduates expect that not enough of their fellowgraduates migrate into the better economy and that, therefore, working culture in the country with the better economy will not be international, they anticipate a loss of human capital (1 − α 0 ) from migration. With such a loss, the less talented graduates prefer to stay in their home country, thereby justifying the initial expectation that not enough graduates migrate. This coordination failure may explain the empirically consistently low intra-European migration rates as compared to the US. They indicate that Europe is trapped in an inefficient low-migration equilibrium.
In a low-migration equilibrium, both the intensity of migration and the human capital that migrants lose depend on the magnitude of α 0 . The higher α 0 , the more human capital can be transferred across borders, and the more intensive migration becomes. Consequently, the migration equilibria with α * = α 0 can be ranked according to the magnitude of α 0 . The equilibria with higher α * = α 0 Pareto-dominate the others. The parameter α 0 represents two things. First, a high α 0 stands for low diversity in national working cultures and languages spoken on the job. For instance, a German graduate finds it easier to realize the full potential of her acquired human capital in Austria than in France. Second, α 0 represents the degree to which a given national higher education system provides human capital that is transferable into the labor market of the other country. For instance, a diploma as provided from German universities before the implementation of the Bologna Process was unknown to employers in other European countries, and graduates with a diploma have not been appreciated much in European countries other than Germany. Thus, prior to the Bologna Process, migration of a small number of graduates from Germany to, for instance, England was characterized by a low α 0 . Consequently, α 0 rises, when, in line with the Bologna process, Europe harmonizes university degrees. 10 
Welfare Effect of Migrants
In this subsection we identify the different welfare effects of raising the transferability of human capital from α 0 to 1. We show that the social welfare of country H and the federation as a whole increases, while the effect on the welfare of country L is ambiguous.
First consider the welfare in the booming country H. Because the natives of the booming country do not migrate, each talent θ ∈ [0, 1] contributes θ(1 + π) to their country's welfare. In addition, country H captures a share 1 − γ from the migrants with talent θ ∈ (θ(α 0 ), 1] from country L. Overall welfare in country H is, therefore,
A low transferability of human capital reduces the accumulated positive externalities produced by migrants on country H. We may use expression (2) to compute the welfare gain from raising the transferability from α 0 to 1:
The sign of expression (3) is unambiguously positive; country H gains when the transferability of human capital becomes perfect. The two integrals in (3) reveal a welfare gain from two different sources. First, imperfect transferability of human capital keeps medium talented migrants born in country L away from the labor market in H. It leads to an inefficient matching of graduates and jobs. The first integral in (3) represents the gain in improving the matching when the transferability of human capital becomes perfect. Second, highly talented migrants from country L, who migrate regardless of the migration inefficiency 1 − α 0 , are more productive in H without the migration inefficiency. The second integral in (3) expresses this welfare gain.
Next consider the welfare effects on country L. After finishing their education, only the graduates with talents belowθ(α * ) remain in L. These immobile graduates contribute their full productivity to country L's welfare. The more talented graduates θ >θ(α * ) migrate into country H, and these mobile graduates contribute only a fraction γ of their productivity to the country's social welfare. Country L's welfare is therefore
It follows that an increase in the transferability of human capital from α 0 to 1 increases country L's welfare by
Expression (5) shows that an elimination of the inefficiencies in the transferability of human capital has positive and negative effects on country L. Its sign is therefore ambiguous. The first integral in the expression demonstrates the negative effect that a higher transferability increases the outflow of graduates from country L. Because the country loses a share 1 − γ of the productivity of migrants, this impacts country L's welfare negatively. Yet, graduates migrate because it raises their personal welfare and this has a positive effect on country L's social welfare. The second integral captures the change in personal welfare of graduates who become mobile when the transferability of human capital is 1 rather than α 0 . Finally, the third integral captures the change in welfare from those graduates who migrate regardless of the imperfect transferability; their utility is larger with perfect transferability and this benefits country L.
Considering the overall welfare effects confirms the intuition that an elimination of the migration inefficiency raises overall welfare in Federation 1:
The expression is unambiguously positive, because θπ > γθπ > c for all θ ∈ (θ(α 0 ),θ (1)). The first integral represents the federation's welfare gain from a better matching of jobs and graduates. The second integral represents the welfare gain from mobile graduates, who, with perfect transferability, do no longer have their human capital diminished.
Given that the two countries are symmetric ex ante, they both expect a positive gain from high mobility and, therefore, have a strict incentive in period 1 to eliminate any migration inefficiency. 16 
Global Competition for Talent
Empirically, not only migration of highly skilled within Europe is low as compared with the US, but also immigration of highly skilled into Europe. Because of shrinking populations and increased globalized competition, European politicians increasingly speak out in favor of highly skilled immigration.
11 The Bologna and the Lisbon Process are build on this opinion and aim at making Europe more attractive for talents from non-European countries.
In this section we investigate the idea that the low intra-and interEuropean migration rates are interrelated, because low transferability of human capital deters inter-European migration. The reasoning is straightforward: If it is more costly to transfer acquired human capital within Europe than within the US, then insurance against locally unfavorable economic conditions is more costly in Europe. This translates into a preference for the U.S. and leads to low rates of inter-European migration.
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We extend our model to study immigration from a third part of the world, e.g. Asia, into two federations, Federation 1 and Federation 2. Federation 1 represents Europe and Federation 2 represents the U.S. In order to focus on the above argument, we assume that Federation 2 is identical to Federation 1 except that in Federation 2, human capital is fully transferable across borders.
11 See, for instance, page 45 of Kok (2003) , the 2003 report of the European Employment Taskforce. There, the following policy suggestion is made: "Labour migration has to be managed more effectively if it is to be an effective response to labour market needs and in order to achieve better integration. While priority must be given to using the existing labour reserves in the EU, carefully managed immigration could help prevent imbalances in the European labour force, both in terms of age and of skills structure."
12 European Politicians seem to be aware of this. For instance, Kok (2003) suggests:
"The procedures for admission of workers from third countries should be made simpler, quicker and more transparent. Mobility from one Member State to another by third country nationals already legally present in one Member State should also be facilitated." These are not completely empty words: In 2009, the European Parliament has decided to introduce the Blue Card which will legally allow immigrants to work and migrate within the European Union as long as they stay employed.
In particular, each federation consists of two countries, each with mass 1 of individuals with talent θ uniformly distributed over [0, 1] . The individual θ i first studies at a university in her home country and, thereby, acquires human capital θ i . After observing economic conditions, she then has to decide where to work and realize her human capital. As in Federation 1, exactly one country in Federation 2 has a positive economic shock π > 0, whereas the other country in Federation 2 does not. Each country is equally likely to have the booming economy. There is no unemployment among graduates; a firm in each of the two countries enables each graduate to realize her productivity. A graduate appropriates the same share γ of this productivity as in Federation 1, while the remaining part accrues to the country where the individual works. When a graduate migrates within Federation 2, she incurs a fixed cost c > 0. The only, but crucial difference between Federation 1 and 2 is that when a graduate migrates in Federation 2, she does not lose any human capital:
Let H 2 denote the country in Federation 2 with the highly productive economy and L 2 the country with the worse economy. Then, a graduate i from H 2 earns γθ i (1 + π) in her home country H 2 and γθ i − c in the other country L 2 . Consequently, all natives from H 2 remain in their home country, where their productivity is higher. In contrast, a graduate i from L 2 earns γθ i (1+π)−c in country H 2 and γθ i in her home country L 2 . Hence, migration into H 2 is beneficial to i if and only if
We assume that the cost of migration is low enough, c < γπ, so that there always exist some highly talented individuals from L 2 for whom migration is profitable. In particular, individuals from country L 2 migrate into country H 2 exactly when
Now consider immigrants from some third country C. Because we focus on student immigration, we assume that no university is stationed in C. Therefore, individuals in C must obtain their human capital either in Federation 1 or Federation 2. Empirically, a large share of graduates from developing countries who obtained their degree in Europe or the U.S. remain in the developed part of the world. Accordingly, we assume that immigrants do not return to country C but stay in the federation where they acquired their human capital. Hence, we also abstract from migration between federations.
Immigrants from C differ in two dimensions. First, just as the citizens of the two federations they differ in talent θ ∈ [0, 1]. Second, immigrants differ in their subjective preferences for a specific federation. In particular, let δ ∈ [−1, 1] express the additional utility that an immigrant obtains from migrating to Federation 1 rather than Federation 2. Hence, if δ i > 0, then a specific immigrant i has, all other things equal, a preference for Federation 1. For δ i < 0, immigrant i has a preference for Federation 2. We assume that (θ, δ) are uniformly distributed over the rectangle [0, 1] × [−1, 1] with mass µ.
Immigration Decisions
An immigrant who, after selecting Federation 1, happens to end up in the country with the worse economy will migrate if and only if her talent θ exceedŝ θ(α 1 ). Thus, an immigrant with θ ≥θ(α 1 ) always ends up working in the high productive country, either because she was lucky to pick the booming country from the start or because she, after finishing her education, migrates to the highly productive country. From an ex ante perspective, these two possibilities are equally likely and, therefore, the mobile immigrant expects a payoff from immigrating to Federation 1 of
By contrast, an immigrant θ ≤θ(α 1 ) who has selected Federation 1 finds that migration into the neighboring country is unattractive. This immobile immigrant, therefore, is equally likely to end up working in country L or H.
Hence, an immobile immigrant i expects a payoff from moving to Federation 1 of V ii 1 = γθ(1 + π)/2 + γθ/2 + δ i . Instead, an immigrant who decides to immigrate to Federation 2, ends up working in the highly productive country whenever her talent exceedŝ θ(1). Therefore, this mobile immigrant expects a payoff from immigrating into Federation 2 of
By contrast, an immigrant with a talent of only θ <θ(1) remains immobile in Federation 2 and, therefore, expects a payoff from moving to Federation 2 of V Finally, immigrants with a high talent θ ∈ (θ(α 0 ), 1] are mobile both in Federation 1 and 2, despite a limited transferability of human capital in Federation 1. These highly talented immigrants regard the low transferability α 1 as a disadvantage of Federation 1 that skews their preference towards Federation 2. Thus, the more talented they are, the less of them move to Federation 1. Area IV illustrates these types of immigrants. Figure 4 confirms the idea that due to low transferability of human capital within Federation 1, Federation 1 has less immigrants than Federation 2. Yet, the proposition also reveals that the loss of graduates affects the talent composition in the Federation. Federation 1 loses out on the most talented graduates. Interpreting Federation 1 as Europe and Federation 2 as the U.S., this result is in accordance with the empirical facts. Figure 4 is helpful in guiding our computations concerning the welfare effects of an imperfect transferability of human capital. It shows that we may distinguish four different types of immigrants whom the transferability inefficiency α 1 < 1 affects differently.
Welfare Effects of Immigrants
First, Area I represents the immigrants who decide in favor of Federation 1 despite a low transferability but decide against migrating to country H if they happen to end up in country L. With a perfect transferability of human capital, these immigrants would migrate within the federation and, thereby, raise their productivity by a factor π. Because the federation appropriates a share of 1 − γ of their productivity, an immigrant in Area I of type θ i raises the federation's social welfare by
The relative proportion of immigrants of type θ i in Area I is
so that the welfare effect over Area I is
Area II represents those immigrants who, due to the reduced transferability, move to Federation 2 rather than Federation 1. With a perfect transferability of human capital, these immigrants move to Federation 1 and all end up working in country H. Consequently, an immigrant in Area II of type θ i raises the federation's social welfare by
The relative proportion of immigrants of type θ i in Area II is
22 so that the welfare effect over Area II is
Area III represents those immigrants who decide to move to Federation 1. If these immigrants are unlucky and happen to end up in country L, they, subsequently, migrate to country H. An efficient transferability of human capital, therefore, raises the productivity of these immigrants by a factor (1 − α 1 ). As a result, an immigrant in Area III of type θ i raises the federation's social welfare by
The relative proportion of immigrants of type θ i in Area III is
so that the welfare effect over Area III is
Area IV represents those immigrants who, due to the migration inefficiency in Federation 1, decide to move to Federation 2. Without the inefficiency, they choose Federation 1 and, either by luck or subsequent migration, end up working in country H. An immigrant in Area IV of type θ i raises the federation's social welfare by
The relative proportion of immigrants of type θ i in Area IV is
so that the welfare effect over Area IV is
The overall welfare effects of the additional immigrants who choose Federation 1 if transferability of human capital becomes perfect are
where µ is the mass of immigrants. It is unambiguously positive, because each individual ∆W is positive.
The Bologna and the Lisbon Process
The Bologna and the Lisbon Process are coordinated political attempts to increase mobility in Europe. The declared aims of these measures are to reduce mismatches between jobs and talents and to attract highly skilled immigrants. These two aims are meant to boost productivity in Europe and allow Europe to attain its full potential. In our model, mobility in Federation 1 can be raised by two different approaches, given that the graduates themselves fail to coordinate on the high migration equilibrium. First, transferability of human capital, α 0 , could be enhanced. Second, migration costs c could be lowered for migrants.
The Bologna Process is best understood as an attempt to increase transferability of human capital α 0 by reducing the diversity of higher education systems. In a harmonized education system firms are better able to judge the value of a foreign university degree, which increases the quality of matching between jobs and graduates. The Lisbon Process should be understood in a wider sense. It encompasses all measures that increase labor mobility and immigration of students and workers whose skills are needed in Europe. Accordingly, the European Commission suggests both policies that make human capital more transferable and policies that reduce other migration costs. For instance, in a 2008 report, it says: "The Commission recommends that Member States develop integration and social inclusion policies for mobile workers and their families, using existing EU measures and tools, e.g. on cultural, linguistic and schooling policies and on anti-discrimination and skills recognition."
14 Thus, in the present context, the Lisbon Process can be understood as a bundle of soft policy measures that contribute to both increasing α 0 and decreasing c. However, as can be seen from Figure 3 , targeting α 0 makes sense only if α < 1. This is because only then, the high-migration equilibrium exists at all. Thus, only for α < 1 the high-migration equilibrium can be made unique by increasing α 0 above α. If, by contrast, the starting point of policy is a low-migration equilibrium with α > 1, the only possibility of reaching the high-migration equilibrium is to lower c until α < 1. Intuitively, if migration costs c outweigh the effect of the positive shock on income, γπ, then it is not sufficient to target the transferability of human capital alone. Instead, one first has to enhance the relative importance of the positive economic shock by lowering direct migration costs.
Hence, a policy of increasing α 0 can have one of two effects. On the one hand, it can contribute to increasing migration in a low migration equilibrium, without being sufficient to establish the high migration equilibrium. This happens as long as, for given c, α 0 remains below α. By contrast, if the policies implemented in the course of the Bologna and the Lisbon Process are sufficient to establish α 0 above α, then they will induce the high migration equilibrium.
Finally, an important practical consideration is that the Bologna and the Lisbon Process are both voluntary, cooperative policies. Participating countries must, therefore, each have an individual incentive to implement the respective policies, i.e., each of the countries has to expect an increase in welfare from supporting the Bologna and the Lisbon Process. Our analysis shows that this is guaranteed only ex ante, i.e., prior to the realization of the economic shock. This is so because only the overall expected change in welfare from switching to the high migration equilibrium is unambiguously positive for both of the countries.
This observation suggests a stronger support for long term policies than short term ones. Hence, reforms targeted at the education system might be easier to implement cooperatively than reforms that affect current labor mobility. In the context of our model, this means that increasing α 0 can be achieved cooperatively, whereas it is more difficult to agree about decreasing c by, for example, directly subsidizing migration.
Conclusion
We show that low transferability of human capital thwarts internal migration of talented graduates. This leads to two types of inefficiencies: First, an inefficient matching of graduates and jobs occurs and, as a result, graduates do not attain their full productive potential. Second, low transferability creates a handicap in the global competition for international talents. Interpreting the Lisbon and Bologna Process as means to increase the transferability of human capital, we show how they may help to increase mobility and make Europe a more attractive destination for especially the more talented individuals.
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In order to focus on the imperfect transferability of human capital, we considered a highly stylized model of migration. In particular, we assumed that all countries and federations are symmetric except for the transferability
